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Abstract 
We shall consider the cores of transferable utility games in this 
paper. The concept of core is one of the solutions in the game theory, 
and nonemptiness of the core ensures the stability of the grand coali-
tion of games. A condition of the nonemptiness of cores of transferable 
utility games with finite players is known and it is related to balanced 
families of the coalitions. The purpose of this paper is to generalize 
the' known result for games with finite players and obtain a condi-
tion for nonemptiness of cores of games with infinite players which is 
analogous to the corresponding condition to games of finite players. 
Moreover, we apply the obtained result to market games and prove 
that market games has nonempty cores when the production functions 
of agents or players are concave functions even if the number of the 
agents is infinite. 
1 Introduction 
We express transferable utility games mathematically as follows: Let a flnite 
P = { I , . . . , p} and each element of P denotes players and each nonempty 
subset of P denotes a coalition in the game. We denote by P the family of 
all nonempty subset of P, or the family of all coalitions. Under this setting, 
we deflne a transferable utility game with the players P by the fimction v 
of P U {~} to the real numbers R such that v(~) = O. We call the number 
v(S) the value of the coalition of S. The value of a coalition represents the 
maximal value obtained by the formation of the coalition of S. 
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We have a kind of solutions for transferable utility games which guaran-
tees the grand coalition, that is, the coalition of all the players. We call it the 
core of the game. The mathematical definition of the core of a transferable 
utility game v is the set of all elements x = (xl, . . . , xP) of the Euclidean 
space R~ such that 
~;xj ~ v(S), S ~ p; 
j~s 
~ j = v(P) x 
j~ p 
If there is an element x in the core of the game, then the allocation x is feasible 
by the second equation above and the first inequalities above denotes that 
the allocation gives the best allocation to every coalition in P. Therefore, 
The nonemptiness of cores of games assures the stability of the games. and 
leads the game to the grand coalition. 
From the deflnition above, investing whether cores are empty or not is the 
fundamental problem of game theory. The problem is solved in the games 
with flnite players and a necessary and sufflcient Qondition for the nonempti-
ness of cores is obtained in the relation to the concept of balancedness of the 
family of coalitions. 
Generally speaking, given a finite set P, a family {Si} of the subsets of 
P is said to be balanced if there are corresponding nonnegative numbers 6i 
such that the inequality 
~; 6,iXs. = XP 
holds, where XT denotes the characteristic vector of the subset T of P, that 
is, it is an element of RP defined by X~ = I if j ~ T and X~ = O if j ~ T. 
The nonnegative numbers 6i are called the balancing weights for the balanced 
farnily {Si}. The following is the fundamental theorem in the theory of cores 
of transferable utility games with finite number of players and we can, for 
example, flnd its proof in [3]: 
Theorem 1.1 The transferable utility game v has the nonempty core if and 
only if we howe the inequality 
~5･v(Si) ~ v(p) 
for a'rry balanced family {Si} in P aud the coTrespouding balancing weights 
6i . 
We shall generalize the result above to the case that the transferable 
utility game has infinite number of players in the next section. 
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2 DefinitiOn Of GameS With Infinite PlayerS 
We consider countably infinite number of players and denote the individual 
player by a natural number. Let N be the set of all players or natural numbers 
l , 2, 3, . . . . We restrict the coalitions to ones consisting of finite number of 
players in this paper. Let Jr be the family of all coalitions or finite subsets of 
N . Next , we define a transferable utility game on this coalition structure. A 
transferable utility game is a real-valued function ~) on f with the properties 
v(~) = O; 
v(S) Z O, S ~ f. 
The deflnition of the transferable utility game with infinite players above 
seems to be restrictive comparing with that ¥vith finite players by virtue of the 
second inequalities. However, it has no restriction. The second inequalities 
can be obtained if a sumciently large common number is added to the value 
v(S) for every S e J] in case the game is of finite players. 
Next we proceed to the deflnition of balanced families in the coalition 
structure of inflnite players. A subfamily {Si} of f is said to be a balanced 
family if 
l. for each j ~ N, the number of Si's which contain j is flnite. 
2. there are nonnegative numbers 5i Such that 
~ 6.Xs. = XN (1) 
The sum of the equation (1) means ~;i 6iX~i = X~ = I for all j ~ N, and is 
a finite sum for all j ~ N by the deflnition of balanced families mentioned 
above. Balanced families contain inflnite number of sets because the sets in 
the family are flnite sets. 
Next we define the core for a transferable utility game with infinite play-
ers. It is same as that of flnite players formally. The core of a transferable 
utility game v with inflnite players is the set of all elements x = (xl, x2, . . . ) 
of gl such that 
~;' x~ > 1)(S)) S ~E f. 
i~s 
~x~ = v(N). 
i~:N 
We shall prove the fundamental theorem for the existence of the core of 
a transferable utility game with inflnite players in the next section. 
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3 NOnemptlneSS Of COres 
We consider a transferable utility game v with infinite players and simply 
say 'a game' instead of a transferable utility game with inflnite players in the 
s equel . 
We give a few remarks before stating our main theorem and its proof. A 
game v is said to be O-1 normalized if v({j}) = O for all j ~ N and v(N) = l. 
We can derive a 0-1 normalized game v/ from a game v as follows if the game 
v has the property v(N) > ~j~N v({j}). Deflne a game v/ by 
v/(S) = v(S) - ~;i~;sv({i}) S e f 
v(N) - ~i~N v({i}) ' 
from the original game v. It is easily seen that the game v/ is 0-1 normalized. 
If we can find an element x! of the core of the game v/, we can define an 
element x ~ ~1 by 
~ ' = (v(_N) - ~L1)({i}))x/j + v({j}). x3
i=1 
On the other hand, if the inequality 
~; 6iv(Si) ~ v(N) 
holds for each balanced farnily {Si} with the balanced weights 6i in the 
original game, then we can show that the similar inequality holds for the 0-l 
normalized game v/ as follows: 
, _ ~i 6iv(Si) - ~]i 6i ~j~s~ v({j}) ~~ 6,v (S ) v(N) = ~; v({j}) 
j~N 
< v(N) - ~j~N ~si~j 6iv({j}) 
v(N) - ~;j~N v({j}) 
= I = v/(N) 
Now we show the main theorem of this section. 
Theorem 3.1 A game has a noTbempty core if aud ordy if 
~6,v(S,) ~ v(N) 
holds for any balanced family {Si} with balanced weights 6i. 
(2) 
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Proof We can show that if the core of the game v is nonempty, then the 
inequalities (2) hold for any balanced family in Theorem 3.1 as follows: Let 
~ be an element in the core of the game and let {Si} be a balanced family 
with the balancing weights 6i . Then we have 
･ -~6.~x~3 ~; 6 v(Si) < 
i j ~; s. 
=~;~; ･-' 6, x3 
j~N Si~j 
=~;-j x 
j~N 
=v(N) 
Hence we only need to show that the inequalities (9-) for balanced families 
are a suf~cient condition for the nonemptiness of the core. Moreover, the 
inequality ~j~N v({j}) > v(N) never true if we assume the inequalities (2) 
for balanced family {Si} because the family { {j} I j ~ N }is balanced with 
balancing weights I for all {j}. If ~j~N v({j}) = v(N), then deflne an 
element x of ~lby x3 = v({j}). For any S ~ T, consider a balanced family 
{S} U { {j} I j ~ S }, then we have 
v(S) + ~v({j}) ~ v(N) ~v({3}) 
Hence we have 
v(S) ~ ~Lv({j}), 
j~s 
and x belongs to the core of v. Therefore we can assume that ~j~N v({j}) < 
v(N) without loss of generality. Now we only need to prove the following 
lemma in order to prove Theorem 3.1 according to the remarks mentioned 
just before Theorem 3.1. [] 
Lemma 3.1 A 0-1 wormalized gam.e has a nonempty core uf 
~6~v(S~) ~ 1 
holds foT any balanced famity {Si} with balanced weights 6i . 
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Proof Note that the Banach space ~1 is the dual space of the Banach space 
cc, and endow ~1 with the weak-star topology. We always regard gl as the 
linear topological space endowed with the weak-star topology in the sequel. 
Note that the subset X = { x c ~1 1 x ~ O, ~;j~EN xj ~ I } of ~l is compact. 
Define a real-valued weak-star continuous afline functions fs on X by 
fs(x) = ~; 'i - v(S) x 
i~s 
for each S ~ f with IS ~ 2, where ISI denotes the cardinality of S. Now we 
shall show that, for any flnite elements Si of f and for any corresponding 
flnite nonnegative numbers ~i, there is an element x of X such that 
~. ~zfSi(x) > o 
For any Si, its characteristic vector Xsi is obviously an element of co and we 
have 
~~cfs.(x) = (~~L~ Xs x> ~~ v(S) 
for any x ~ X. The bracket (., .) denotes the dual pair between co and ~l' 
Set oi = maxj ~;i AiX~. , and note that O < c~. Then we have 
?
~ ~i~XSi ~ XN' 
oi 
Set /1j = I -~:si~j Ai/oi for each j ~ N and consider the family i~ = { Si, {j} l 
j ~ N }. Then ~ is a balanced family with balancing weights ~i/oi and 1lj' 
Therefore we have 
A' ~ -v(Si) + ~~L/1jv({j}) < l .oi . 
by hypothesis. Since we consider 0-1 normalized game, the inequality above 
becomes a simpler form 
?
~ i~v(S~) ~ 1 
ai 
or 
~~tv(S.) ~ oi 
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Take the index jo where the maximum of the deflnition of ai is attained, and 
choose an element x of X such that xjo = I and xj = O for j ~ jo' Then we 
have oi = (~i ~iXSi , x) and hence 
~;~tfs. (x) > o 
Therefore, there is an element x of X such that 
fs(x) ~ O 
for all S ~ Jr with ISI Z 2 by virtue of the minimax theorem (cf. [2]). Since 
v({j}) = O for all j ~ A1~ and x belongs to the set X, we have xj > v({j}) 
for any j ~ N. Therefore we have ~3'~sxj > v(S) for all S ~ f. Set 
p = ~j~N xj. If p = l, then x belongs to the core of the game 1). On the 
other hand, if p < l, then set ~1 = xl + I - p and x*3 = xj for j = 2, 3, . . . . 
Then, ~ belongs to the core of the game. [] 
4 Market Games 
We shall apply the fundamental theorem of transferable utility games proved 
in the previous section to the theory of market games. Market games with 
finitely many players are found in [l] and our purpose of this section is to 
generalize the flnite market games to those wlth infinitely many players. We 
shall consider an economic model consisting of inflnitely many producers 
who produce one kind of consumption goods from finitely many kinds of 
production goods. We denote each producer by a natural number) and hence 
N denotes the set of all producers. There are m kinds of production goods) 
say 1,2,. . . , m. Each producer j ha~j an endowment ej ~ Rm, where el. 
denotes the amount of goods I given to the producer j. We assume that th~ 
endowment ej is nonnegative in Rm and the series ~; j~Ar ej co verg s. We 
denote by uj the production fLmction of the producer j. We assume that the 
domain of uj is the nonnegative orthant of Rm and uj is nonnegative-valued. 
We also denote by f the family of all finite subsets of N Iike Section 2 and 
3. The sets in the family f represent coalitions of initely many producers 
in this model. 
We define the value v(S) for a coalition S ~ f as follows: 
v(S) = sup{ ~~Luj(xj) I xj ~ O, j = ~; ~ ej }' xj~s j~s j~s 
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Similarly define the value v(N) for the grand coalition N by 
~L3(x3) I xj ~ 0,~;x = j ~ ej }'v(N) = sup{ ~; ･ -
j~Ar j~N j~N 
We assume that v(N) < oo. Then, it is easily seen that the function v is 
a transferable utility game on the coa,lition structure f of N. We call this 
game a market game because it is defined be virtue of a market model in 
economics . 
Theorem 4.1 If all the production functions uj in the market game are 
conca~)e; then the core of the market gam~ is nonempty. 
Proof We shall show that the inequality ~;i 5iv(Si) < v(N) holds for any 
balanced family {Si} C f with balancing weights 6i. Fix e > o. For each Si, 
take elements xij ~ O (j ~ Si) in ~1 such that 
v(Si) < ~;tLj(xij) + el2 
j~s 
and 
~; = ~ ej' xi j 
j~s* j~s, 
For each j ~ N, define an element xj in gl by 
j=~; -x 6i x i j 
s*~j 
Then, these xj's are redistribution of the total endowment as shown in the 
following equation: 
~ 6ixij 6ixij j=~;~ = ~~;xj~N 3~N S*~j i j~Si 
= ~; 6~ ~ xs3 = ~ 6c ~ e3 
i j~Si i j~Si = ~ ~ 6iej 6iej = 
i j~s, j~Ar s*~~j 
= ~ej~6 = ~  e3 '
j~~N S.~;~j j~N 
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Therefore we have the following inequalities. 
v(N) > ~~Lu3(x3) ~ ~~ = uj (~J 6ixij) 
j ~N s. ~ j j~N - ~; ~; - L 6i L uj(xij) _~r ~ 6iuj (xij ) >
j~N S. ~j i j~s. > ~~L 6i(v(St) - cl2a) = ~ 6iv(Si) - e. 
Since e > o is arbitrary, we have 
1)(N) Z ~ 6it)(Si). 
Therefore, the market game v has the nonempty core by virtue of Theorem 
3.1. [] 
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